Rethinking Kant 4 (2015)

Jeppe von Platz
University of Richmond
In line with the tradition running from Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the idea of moral freedom: that true freedom consists in moral self-determination. The idea of moral freedom raises the problem of moral freedom: if freedom is moral self-determination, it seems that the wicked are not free and therefore not responsible for their wrongdoings. In this essay I discuss Kant's solution to this problem. I argue that Kant distinguishes between four modalities of freedom as moral self-determination and that the problem of moral freedom disappears when these distinctions are brought to light.
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Kant on Moral Freedom and Moral Slavery.David Forman - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (1):1-32.
Is a Good Will Overrated?Thomas E. Hill - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):299-317.

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