Modern substantial approach to the problem of identity of personality

Философия И Культура 1:77-85 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The object of the research of this article is the modern philosophical discourse on the problem of identity of personality. The subject of the study is the substantial approach of R. Swinburne and his place in this discourse. The author analyzes R. Swinburne's approach and, in particular, its main advantages – the ability to solve the problem of personality reduplication. However, as the author of the article shows, the substantive approach itself is not devoid of vulnerabilities. First of all, he is vulnerable to criticism using the verification principle. Swinburne believes that his approach is not consistent only with a strong version of the verification principle. However, as the author of this article shows, even a weak version of the verification principle is a problem for Swinburne's substantive approach. The author presents his own alternative to the substantial approach for overcoming the reduplication argument and interpreting hypothetical situations associated with it. Such an alternative is the perdurant theory of personality. The article presents a study in the field of the history of modern analytical philosophy. Therefore, the key research method used is historical and philosophical. In particular, the study used a textual analysis of the works of philosophers, first of all, R. Swinburne, according to several sources, a reconstruction of his views was carried out. The article also uses the method of comparative analysis, in particular, a comparison of empiricist approaches and a substantive approach to the problem of identity of personality is made. The article is devoted to the substantial concept of identity of R. Swinburne's personality. Despite the fact that this concept represents an important alternative to solving the problem of identity, it has not been studied much, especially in the Russian history of philosophy. The novelty of the article also lies in a detailed analysis of the verification counterargument in relation to the substantive approach. The author of the article also presents his own alternative to the substantial approach, which allows overcoming the indicated difficulties. As a result of the research, the author comes to the conclusion that the substantial approach only partially solves the problem of asynchronous identity of personality, and is most vulnerable to criticism with the help of the verification argument.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,435

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Personal identity.P. K. Mohapatra - 1983 - Cuttack: Santosh Publications.
Self-Identity Theory and Research Methods.Mardi J. Horowitz - 2012 - Journal of Research Practice 8 (2):Article - M14.
The Unity of the Concept of Matter in Aristotle.Ryan Miller - 2018 - Dissertation, The Catholic University of America

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-08

Downloads
3 (#1,700,719)

6 months
1 (#1,491,286)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Personal Identity and Individuation.Bernard Williams - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:229-252.
On the simplicity of the soul.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:167-181.

Add more references