Abstract

In Bush v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court raises an important question about the nature of political fairness. The Court seems to have endorsed a demanding view, according to which inequality may be unfair simply because it is "arbitrary." In contrast, critics of the Court's decision hold that political inequalities are acceptable unless they can be expected to disadvantage specific persons. The critics view is arguably the dominant view among democratic theorists. And it shapes their position on some of the key controversies about democratic institutions--the choice between proportional and winner-take-all representation, the system of political finance, and the design of ballot access requirements. Yet I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. The Court is right to suppose that arbitrary political inequalities may be objectionable, even when they do not create predictable patterns of discrimination or disadvantage. And this conclusion may lead us to rethink the controversies about representation, political finance, and ballot access