Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25 (2005)
AbstractJerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment our innate representational system and improve our ability to think by learning a natural language
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References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work
Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive Architecture: Toward Understanding How The Mind Works.Sheldon J. Chow - unknown
Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds.Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
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