Freuds drifttheorie: Van partiële pulsie naar eros/thanatos

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (3):465 - 492 (2001)
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Abstract

In this article, the author discusses the thesis that Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis proposes a radical split between man and animal, and argues that this split is closely connected to the drive. Arguments for this thesis are found in the works of Freud and Lacan. According to Freud, the inner traumatic pressure (‘Drang’) of the drive becomes from its first occurrence associated with the figure of the external Other. From this Other, an answer or representation is expected. Two central problems regarding the drive are discussed, the representation problem and the problem of aim. The representation problem relates to the unbridgeable gap between the real of the drive and the symbolic presence of the Other. The problem of aim concerns the contradictory intention inherent in the drive. Freud found that two tendencies are working at the same time. One is striving towards complete separation and the other strives to undo the separation. This brought him to formulate a dualism in his drive theory: the relationship between Thanatos and Eros. This dualism explains why the drive remains ever unsatisfied: once one aim is reached the possibility of reaching the other is lost, and vice versa. As a conclusion, Lacan's main ideas on this subject are mentioned. The double and contradictory aim of the drive is traced back to a double lack. A primordial lack is situated in the Real, since eternal life is lost. Within humans, attempts to undo this loss lead to a second (Symbolic) lack. The original lack is thereby re-written as a phallic lack in the relation between subject and Other. As a consequence the primordial loss is confirmed on a different and more distant level. The result is a circular, non-reciprocal relationship ‘qui ne cesse pas de ne pas s'écrire’. The missing link between man and nature remains missing

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