Mechanistic explanation in engineering science

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):349-375 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I apply the mechanistic account of explanation to engineering science. I discuss two ways in which this extension offers further development of the mechanistic view. First, functional individuation of mechanisms in engineering science proceeds by means of two distinct sub types of role function, behavior function and effect function, rather than role function simpliciter. Second, it offers refined assessment of the explanatory power of mechanistic explanations. It is argued that in the context of malfunction explanations of technical systems, two key desiderata for mechanistic explanations, ‘completeness and specificity’ and ‘abstraction’, pull in opposite directions. I elaborate a novel explanatory desideratum to accommodate this explanatory context, dubbed ‘local specificity and global abstraction’, and further argue that it also holds for mechanistic explanations of malfunctions in the biological domain. The overall result is empirically-informed understanding of mechanistic explanation in engineering science, thus contributing to the ongoing project of understanding mechanistic explanation in novel or relatively unexplored domains. I illustrate these claims in terms of reverse engineering and malfunction explanations in engineering science

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,894

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

When mechanistic models explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.Carlos Zednik - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (2):238-263.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-19

Downloads
33 (#361,461)

6 months
1 (#483,919)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Functional analysis.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.

View all 45 references / Add more references