Philosophical Studies 92 (1):67--84 (1998)

Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame
Many important metaphysical arguments validly deduce an actuality from a possibility. For example: Because it is possible for me to exist in the absence of anything material, I am not my body. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that our capacity for modal judgment is equal to the task of determining whether the "possibility" premise of any of these arguments is true. I connect this thesis with Stephen Yablo's recent work on the epistemology of modal statements.
Keywords A Priori, Epistemology, Knowledge, Modal, Possibility
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DOI 10.1023/a:1017159501073
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