Abstract
This chapter addresses a difficulty facing Aquinas’s view of post-mortem identity that is posed by his account of the separated soul. Called the Two-Person Problem, the difficulty is that—although Aquinas denies that the human soul is identical to either the human being or the human person—the disembodied soul has agency and self-reference in the period between death and bodily resurrection. If the soul is not identical to you, however, who is it? And how can you be brought back at the resurrection? This chapter considers two promising solutions to this problem. Unfortunately, neither of these proposals solves the Two-Person Problem. The chapter believes that Aquinas’s account of human nature does not, as it stands, possess the resources to overcome this difficulty; and so concludes that reconstructing a Thomistic account that involves immediate bodily resurrection, though a radical approach, is best suited to preserve the most essential features of Aquinas’s theory.