Abstract

In this paper I enquire 1) whether Wittgenstein retains the notion of picture after the Tractatus in a way that is more than simply an equivocation, so to speak, an ambiguous use of the term according to multiple meanings or senses; and, if so, 2) what the consequences of this might be for Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as an activity of clarification. More precisely, I shall take into consideration three possible interpretations of the Tractatus’ (use of) ‘picture’ and adopt the one according to which what Wittgenstein notes in his later writings may be regarded as a fresh engagement with, redevelopment of, and variation of it. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s new thoughts on pictures and on the many ways "we make to ourselves pictures of facts” (TLP: 2.1) reveal a certain aspect that is not immediately evident, yet is inherent in the Tractatus’ notion of picture: pictures lie at root of the genesis and (dis)solution of linguistic-conceptual confusions and philosophical dogmatism.