The Virtue in Vice: Short-Sightedness in the Study of Moral Emotions

Emotion Review 3 (3):276-277 (2011)
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Abstract

Emotions that are motivated by self-interest, such as jealousy, pride, and revenge, are considered to be vices. We examine the long-term consequences of such states, and suggest that, in addition to promoting immediate individual rewards, they may ultimately function to enhance collective well-being and, as such, contribute importantly to the stability of moral systems.

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Citations of this work

Disgust Talked About.Nina Strohminger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):478-493.
Disgust Talked About.Nina Strohminger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):478-493.
Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.

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References found in this work

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya.

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