Content and Concept: An Examination of Transcendental Empiricism
Dissertation, University of Arkansas (
2013)
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Abstract
In this dissertation, I critically examine the philosophy of transcendental empiricism.
Transcendental empiricism is, among other things, a philosophy of mental content. It attempts to
dissolve an epistemological dilemma of mental content by splitting the difference between two
diametrically opposed accounts of content. John McDowell's minimal empiricism and Richard
Gaskin's minimalist empiricism are two versions of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental
empiricism itself originates with McDowell's work.
This dissertation is divided into five parts. First, in the Introduction, I state the
Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical orientation of transcendental empiricism. This
metaphilosophical approach provides a plateau upon which much of the rest of this work may be
examined. Second, I offer a detailed description of McDowell’s minimal empiricism. Third, I
critique Gaskin's critique and modification of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that (1)
Gaskin's critiques are faulty and that (2) Gaskin's minimalist empiricism is very dubious. Fourth,
I scrutinize the alleged credentials of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that McDowell's
version of linguistic idealism is problematic. I then comment on a recent dialogue between
transcendental empiricism and Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenology. The dialogue culminates with
Dreyfus's accusation of the “Myth of the Mental.” I argue that this accusation is correct in which
case McDowell's direct realism is problematic. I conclude that minimal empiricism does not
dissolve the dilemma of mental content. Finally, I argue that Tyler Burge successfully
undermines the doctrine of disjunctivism, but disjunctivism is crucial for transcendental
empiricism. Ultimately, however, I aim to show that transcendental empiricism is an attractive
alternative to philosophies of mental content.