Doing and allowing good

Analysis 82 (4):630-637 (2022)
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Abstract

Many people think that the moral reason against doing harm is stronger than the moral reason against allowing harm. What should these people think about doing and allowing good? I address this question by distinguishing two ways of understanding the doing/allowing distinction. The agency view implies that the moral reason for doing good is stronger than the moral reason for allowing good. The imposition view implies that the moral reason against preventing good is stronger than the moral reason against failing to do good. I defend the imposition view and explore its implications for the comparative strength of harm-based and benefit-based reasons.

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Charlotte Franziska Unruh
University of Southampton

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References found in this work

The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Harming as making worse off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.
Doing and Allowing Harm.Fiona Woollard - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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