On What There Must Be [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):736-737 (1976)
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Abstract

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world."

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