Inductive Reasoning in Social Choice Theory

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (4):551-575 (2019)
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Abstract

The usual procedure in the theory of social choice consists in postulating some desirable properties which an aggregation procedure should verify and derive from them the features of a corresponding social choice function and the outcomes that arise at each possible profile of preferences. In this paper we invert this line of reasoning and try to infer, up from what we call social situations the criteria verified in the implicit aggregation procedure. This inference process, which extracts intensional from extensional information can be seen as an exercise in “qualitative statistics”.

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2019-01-13

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Marcelo Auday
Universidad Nacional del Sur

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References found in this work

Mathematical logic.Joseph R. Shoenfield - 1967 - Reading, Mass.,: Addison-Wesley.
First-order logic.Raymond Merrill Smullyan - 1968 - New York [etc.]: Springer Verlag.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
First-order Logic.William Craig - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (2):237-238.

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