Taking an 'intentional stance' on moral psychology

In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. New York: Bloomsbury. pp. 101-124 (2014)
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Why do ethicists eat their greens?Andrew Sneddon - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):902-923.
Well‐Being Blindness.Andrew Sneddon - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):130-155.

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