Abstract

I examine and critically evaluate the anti-skeptical force of two possible readings of Davidson's transcendental argument that purport to show that belief is in its nature veridical. I label these the stronger and the weaker readings. I argue that the stronger reading fails to answer global skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. The main objection to the stronger reading is that it seems to undermine our claims to knowledge of our own mental content by positing the external world as the determinant of belief content. ;The weaker reading of Davidson's anti-skeptical argument also fails to answer global skepticism for it can only show that speakers must believe that belief is in its nature veridical. A revised version of the weaker reading is suggested by Anthony Brueckner and I discuss this revised version. I conclude that the revised weaker reading succeeds in showing that it is impossible to correctly conceive of radical error in belief if the conditions of interpretation are the way Davidson describes them. This revised weaker reading undermines the intelligibility of the skeptical hypotheses put forth by the skeptic to support a premise in his argument. However, the global skeptic raises some objections to Davidson's account of radical interpretation; the most important of which is that Davidson's criterion for determining who can be correctly categorized as a speaker is inadequate. So, the global skeptic concludes that Davidson's account is flawed and rejects it. The global skeptic concludes that Davidson shows that 'speakers' cannot be correctly categorized as being radically mistaken, but that Davidson is unclear and inconsistent with regards to his criteria for determining who can be correctly categorized as a 'speaker'