Making Sense of Malebranche's Occasionalist Argument for Living Morally

History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):23–36 (2021)
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Abstract

In two places, Nicolas Malebranche makes a strange moral argument that he presents as an advantage of his occasionalist metaphysics. Because God is the only true cause, every choice of sin can only be given causality by God's power. Every sinner, therefore, profanely forces God to serve sin; to avoid such sacrelige, the occasionalist has extra reason to avoid sin. My analysis of Malebranche's reasoning shows how this initially perplexing argument does indeed work and, in fact, provides a useful example of how several distinct pieces of his philosophical theology come together to form a surprisingly cohesive argument.

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Mark Robert Taylor
University of Oklahoma

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References found in this work

Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil.Samuel Newlands - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):281-308.
Malebranche.Andrew Pyle - 2003 - New York: Routledge.
Occasionalism and general will in Malebranche.Steven M. Nadler - 1993 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1):31-47.

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