Rigour and Intuition

Erkenntnis 86 (6):1757-1781 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper sketches an account of the standard of acceptable proof in mathematics—rigour—arguing that the key requirement of rigour in mathematics is that nontrivial inferences be provable in greater detail. This account is contrasted with a recent perspective put forward by De Toffoli and Giardino, who base their claims on a case study of an argument from knot theory. I argue that De Toffoli and Giardino’s conclusions are not supported by the case study they present, which instead is a very good illustration of the kind of view of proof defended here.

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References found in this work

Rigor and Structure.John P. Burgess - 2015 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
On formal and informal provability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2009 - In Ø. Linnebo O. Bueno (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 263--299.
How to think about informal proofs.Brendan Larvor - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):715-730.

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