The Role of Experience in Descartes’ Metaphysics: Analyzing the Difference Between Intuitus, Intelligentia and Experientia
Abstract
Descartes uses the term experience (experientia; expérience) many time not only in the subject of physics but also in the one of metaphysics, especially in the arguments about the cogito and the free will: “he learns [‘I am thinking, therefore I am’] from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing” (2ae Resp., AT-VII, 140; CSM-II, 100); “I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way” (Med., AT-VII, 56; CSM-II, 39), and so on. However, it is not clear what Descartes means by the term experientia; he never defines it. Then what is experience in Descartes’ metaphysics? In this paper, I intend to explore what Descartes meant by the term “experience” in the context of metaphysics. To be concrete, I first compare Descartes with earlier philosophers and clarify that Descartes’ use of the term “experience” has characteristics that were not recognized earlier (Section 1). I then clarify what the role of experience in Descartes is, while examining the validity of previous studies that equate Descartes’ experience with intuition and understanding (sections 2 and 3).