Abstract

In this thesis, I am primarily concerned with two related questions: when is a democratic government consolidated and what determines any particular country's prospects for consolidation. First, I defend an understanding of the consolidation of democracy. Then, to consider what might determine a country's prospects for consolidation, I begin my investigation by broadly surveying and analysing the current literature on this issue. Following this, I narrow my sights on the issue of civil society and social capital. ;I carry out a detailed examination of Robert Putnam's work on social capital. I conclude that his argument is plagued by several problems, the most serious of which is its circularity. By appealing to data regarding levels of interpersonal trust in various countries and measuring that data against their level of democratization, I argue that the evidence does not support the claim that social capital, and by extension civil society, is either a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. I defend an approach where many factors play important roles in determining the possibility of stable and effective democratic government. While I claim that these factors can facilitate or obstruct consolidation, I further argue that none of these should be seen as invariantly necessary or sufficient for democratic consolidation in all countries. Rather, the importance of these factors will vary given the particular local situation of any country. Furthermore, I am committed to the idea that adequate statecraft can achieve the consolidation of democracy in very diverse countries, including ones lacking the conditions typically laid down by consolidation theorists. ;As well, I carry out a case study of Paraguay, concentrating on events since 1989. I argue that this case study corroborates my larger claim that no specific condition or set of conditions can be articulated that is either necessary or sufficient for all countries to consolidate a democratic government