Abstract

A part of Aquinas’s argument against occasionalism is that creatures like human beings must be true causes in order to be able to grow and be perfected. Were humans not true causes, God’s promises and exhortations to humankind are for naught. Here, I explore the role of virtue in habit and the perfection of human beings in Aquinas, with the larger goal of using this discussion of virtue to address secondary causation. Virtue is relevant because a) creatures can act as secondary causes because of the powers God has imbued in their nature and b) humans must be secondary causes or else they could not strive toward the good by attaining proper habits. To pursue a clearer understanding of Aquinas’s theory of secondary causes, then, it is necessary to further explore how virtue acquisition works. To that end, I will discuss the role of habit, which is the basis of virtue, the notion of virtue itself and how it is acquired by these secondary causes, the importance of the acquisition of virtues through proper habits, and the connection virtue has to secondary causes.