Abstract

In this book Professor Berry concisely and convincingly demonstrates two points: the various reasons “why Hume’s thought has indeed been frequently read as a contributor to or progenitor of conservatism” (154), and why the author nonetheless disagrees with this assessment. According to Berry, to identify some—or in fact many—elements or strains of conservative thoughts in Hume’s writings is one thing and to classify him as a conservative thinker another. Berry picks up four major themes of analysis: Hume’s theories of causation and of justice, his economic thought, and his remarks on superstition. Rather than constituting distinct elements of the philosopher’s thought, these strands are seen as closely intertwined. As for the first two, Berry argues that Hume’s theories of causation and justice are solidly founded upon his emphasis on custom and habit, and he perceives here “the clear connection between Hume’s epistemology and his political and moral philosophy” (43). Despite accepting this, Berry claims that overall Hume is not a conservative philosopher. The focal point of Berry’s argument is Hume’s criticism of superstition: he contends that Hume’s term ‘superstition’ has a wider sense, indicating bad customs. This means that, despite his emphasis on custom and habit in epistemology and politics, Hume neither accepts nor justifies every historically well established custom. For example, he criticizes many mercantilist laws (such as usury and sumptuary laws), which according to Berry’s reading, can be regarded as based on a kind of economic superstition. On this point, Hume can be more easily depicted as a liberal rather than a conservative thinker.