Abstract

This dissertation examines the question: Under what conditions, if any, is legal restriction of pornography morally justified? It begins with a chapter on John Stuart Mill. In On Liberty, Mill presents cogent arguments in defense of the claim that free speech is worth protecting. Chapter One also delineates the moral parameters necessary for a morally justified free speech principle. Mill defends the thesis that legally restricting speech is morally justified if and only if the harm of the speech is sufficient to outweigh the benefits afforded by freedom of speech. ;In the subsequent six chapters, arguments are presented that identify a specific harm of pornography. Each argument is then assessed to see whether the identified harm is sufficient to morally justify legally restricting pornography. The arguments fall into two categories: those that rely on the effects of pornography for their force, and those that locate the harm in pornography's inherent nature. Although not all the arguments considered seek to establish that the alleged harm is sufficient to justify legal restriction, the aim of this project is to decide whether these arguments could be used for this purpose. ;Chapter Two discusses David Linton's claim that the harm of pornography consists in the fact that it is offensive. His approach is novel because of his "anomaly" theory of offensiveness. Chapter Three studies Lorenne Clark's argument for the claim that pornography promotes sexual inequality. Chapter Four examines Wendell's proposal that pornography is harmful because it causes fear and anxiety. The arguments discussed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four identify the harm of pornography with its effects. ;Chapter Five considers Ann Garry's case for the thesis that pornography is harmful on intrinsic grounds, namely that its content degrades women. Chapter Six evaluates Malinda Vadas' view that pornography is harmful because it is, literally, the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women. ;It is concluded that none of the harms identified establish sufficient harm. Finally, in Chapter Seven, an analogy is presented to show that if pornography has a certain combination of harmful effects, then legally restricting it is morally justified