Abstract

This paper is an attempt to reflect on our relative proximity and remoteness to Nazi perpetrators of evil by examining what Bernard Williams has called the problem of “moral luck.” Such situational factors as genetics, class, race/ethnicity, religion, political upheavals and special nurturing relationships provide us with what John Rawls has called the “starting points” of our lives as emergent adults and moral agents. For skeptics like Williams, though, it is unclear that either “saint” or “sinner” has the requisite moral responsibility we take them ordinarily to have, given such situational luck. This paper responds to such skepticism by sketching a version of “compatibilism” that helps itself to insights from recent virtue theory in ethics and functionalism in cognitive science. A major part of this response is a discussion of Chapter 6 of David H. Jones’ important study, Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust, where he argues that Hitler was to blame for the evil he perpetrated because he was responsible for becoming the person he was through an active project of self-deception. Of particular concern here will be how we can use a functionalist account of mind, virtue/vice and compatibilism to understand the phenomenon of a moral agent engaged in an active project of self-deception. At stake here is, of course, our own proximity to such agency.