Modelling reciprocal altruism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):533-551 (1996)
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Abstract

Biologists rely extensively on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game to model reciprocal altruism. After examining the informal conditions necessary for reciprocal altruism, I argue that formal games besides the standard iterated Prisoner's Dilemma meet these conditions. One alternate representation, the modified Prisoner's Dilemma game, removes a standard but unnecessary condition; the other game is what I call a Cook's Dilemma. We should explore these new models of reciprocal altruism because they predict different stability characteristics for various strategies; for instance, I show that strategies such as Tit-for-Tat have different stability dynamics in these alternate models.

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References found in this work

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.Robert L. Trivers - 1971 - Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1):35-57.
Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas.Elliott Sober - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):127.

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