Abstract

To account for personal identity across time, a number of theories have been advanced. What standard may we appeal to in adjudicating between theories? Locke observes that 'person' "is a Forensick Term appropriating actions and their merit" . A person is a being to whom acts and their worth are considered to attach. Attributions of moral responsibility exist over time, as do persons to whom they apply. In accepting the practice of holding persons morally responsible, one evidently accepts a certain framework within which a satisfactory understanding of the persistence of a person is to be worked out. ;This investigation into personal identity involves assessing theories of personal identity in the light of our practice of holding persons morally responsible. After a discussion of the reasonableness of using the practice as a benchmark, an inquiry is made into how well prominent views of personal identity fare when it comes to providing a satisfactory grounding of our practice of holding persons morally responsible. ;Historical perspectives considered here are those put forth by Descartes, Locke, and Hume. These sections focusing on the soul, consciousness, and perceptions, respectively, serve as a foundation for understanding the issues and function as a useful background for the more contemporary approaches. The more recent debates have often been between adherents of a physical criterion and adherents of a psychological criterion. Views of Williams and Nagel are discussed, as are views of Parfit and Shoemaker. I adduce reasons in favor of adopting a psychological criterion over a physical criterion. Despite the strength of a purely psychological criterion, the available evidence indicates that the most tenable conclusion about personal identity is a psychologically-oriented closest continuer theory suggested by Nozick. Parfit's revisionist claims are also evaluated. I suggest that a compelling rationale has not been provided for altering our practice of holding persons morally responsible and that the manner in which persons actually persist essentially coheres with our established practice