Descartes and the Principles of Scientific Knowledge (in Czech)

Filosoficky Casopis 53 (2):243-265 (2005)
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Abstract

This article attempts to explain Descartes's understanding of the possibilities, objectives, and functions of scientific knowledge in the Principia philosophiae. In the standard interpretation the scientific system in the Principia is constructed deductively, but a deeper examination shows that Descartes's understanding very much resembles the voluntarism of late medieval nominalist theology. He emphasizes the contingency of the created world, which at every moment is dependent on the power of God that sustains it. Descartes further believes that the infinite God is inaccessible to finite beings, and therefore it is not possible to substantiate scientific knowledge by injecting human reason into the ideas of God, as is the case with Kepler and Galileo. (edited)

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