Abstract

In this essay, I implement an analysis of language in and of the legal process and an analysis of language as evidence in an investigation of the merits of Louisiana State Supreme Court Justice Scott J. Crichton’s opinion that Warren Demesme was requesting a “lawyer dog.” In my analysis of language in and of the legal process, I focus on case law pertaining to Miranda Warnings, wherein insights from forensic linguists researching evidence collection and speech act theory are central to my methodology. Gathering insights from my analysis, I move to an examination of language as evidence in State of Louisiana v. Warren Demesme, wherein I conclude that Warren Demesme was not requesting a “lawyer dog” as Louisiana State Supreme Court Justice Scott J. Crichton suggests and that a “reasonable police officer in light of the circumstances…would have understood,” that Demesme was using an indirect impolite speech act when he said dawg and not dog in his statement. In my conclusion, I argue that Demesme’s request for an attorney was unambiguous and unequivocal.