Abstract

This is a competent book about a rich and tantalizing topic, the nature and status of the emotions aroused by fictional characters and events. The problem, simply stated, is how a person--say, a member of a theater audience--can be emotionally moved by a scene which he or she fully knows to be play-acted, the suffering on stage merely feigned. The underlying assumption, of course, is that emotions have certain cognitive presuppositions, one of which, presumably, is the actual existence of the facts or states of affairs that provoke them. This suggests what the author calls "a paradox of belief" according to which one must both believe and not believe in the reality of a certain state of affairs, and the book is devoted to the resolution of this seeming paradox. He pursues a number of suggestions, beginning with what he considers the origin of the paradox in a 1975 article by Colin Radford, who argued that such emotions involve us in incoherence and inconsistency, through a number of suggestions ranging from the "reformist" to the "radical", all of which he argues to be inadequate. Boruah's own solution--which he calls "conservative"--is to distinguish what he calls the "evaluative" from the "existential" beliefs involved in emotion, insisting that essential evaluative beliefs are common to both real-life as well as fictional examples even if the latter do not satisfy existential requirements. In such cases, it is the imagination, coupled with belief, that explains the legitimacy of what the author awkwardly calls "fictional emotions."