Abstract

This thesis defends a version of feminist empiricism as the theoretical position best able to accommodate the critical and positive moods of feminist philosophy of science. Strong emphasis is given to the importance of narrative approaches to knowledge, especially to the need to interrogate the structure of existing knowledge claims in order to mount effective challenges to them. These central commitments are supported by a survey and critique of some of the central arguments of recent feminist approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science. The strong association between the core values of science and its intrinsic masculinity is examined and rejected as historically and conceptually untenable. The shift toward communally based epistemologies is received with guarded optimism. If due care is taken in the description and assessment of the scientific community and its projects, and so long as individual autonomy and responsibility are preserved, then recognition of the influence of group mechanisms in the construction of knowledge will be a positive advance for feminist theory. It is argued that treating the knowledge-seeking process as an interactive one will be a cautious and effective way to proceed. The dismissal of "bad" science as a fringe phenomenon with no serious philosophical implications is seen as hasty. One component of feminist empiricism is its commitment to socially dictated norms governing science, so it must be willing to confront violations of norms. This confrontation is also attuned to the feminist empiricist affirmation that science must be regarded as a process deeply embedded in multiple social structures