Frequency-dependent causation

Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):247-253 (1982)
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Abstract

In what follows, I propose to evaluate Giere's analysis by applying it to a causal process considered in evolutionary theory, namely, natural selection. To say that there is selection for a given trait is to say that possessing that trait causes differential reproductive success. If there is selection for a trait and if no other evolutionary forces impinge and there is no "sampling error" due to random drift, individuals with the trait will on average have more offspring than individuals without it. But sampling error can't be discounted for finite populations; so the combined effect of selection and drift will be a probability distribution of numbers of offspring. In this event, selection for a trait will imply that the mean value of the distribution associated with the individuals possessing the trait exceeds the mean value for individuals without the trait. Evolutionary theory assigns a probability distribution of possible reproductive outputs to each organism and, thereby, views organisms as stochastic systems. This implies no commitment to indeterminacy at the microlevel, of course.

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Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Tempered realism about the force of selection.C. Kenneth Waters - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):553-573.
Common cause explanation.Elliott Sober - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):212-241.
How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence.Erik Weber - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):277-295.
Probabilistic causality: Reply to John dupré.Ellery Eells - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):105-114.
Probabilistic causal interaction.Ellery Eells - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):52-64.

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