Naturalized Epistemology as a Framework for Understanding Hume's Science of Human Nature

Dissertation, University of Minnesota (1986)
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Abstract

Hume is a major figure in the history of modern philosophy who is remembered primarily for his skeptical attacks on the rational foundation of science, morality, and religion. However, since Kemp Smith , there has been an effort to understand Hume's positive program and to take seriously his claim that only by first understanding the principles of human nature will it be possible to provide a truly solid foundation for any of the sciences. I propose a general framework for understanding Hume's positive program and show how it applies to the major areas of his philosophy. This framework is taken from current work in naturalized epistemology and emphasizes the appeal to reliable belief-forming mechanisms and the importance of psychological considerations in theories of knowledge and morality. I argue that custom and sympathy are best understood as reliable belief-forming mechanisms which provide a foundation for knowledge and morality. I also examine the role of reflective thinking in Hume's philosophy and his position on metaphysics. I conclude that the framework of naturalized epistemology not only provides a consistent interpretation of Hume's positive program but also indicates how to understand and reconcile the more troublesome aspects of his philosophy

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