Are dispositions to believe constitutive for understanding?

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):37-47 (2013)
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Abstract

T. Williamson argues against the thesis he recognizes as one of the inferentialist basic idea that he formulates as understanding/assent link, the claim that the assent to a sentence is constitutive for understanding it. This paper aims to show that appropriately articulated dispositional theory, could plausibly account for a weak version of inferentialism.

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Nenad Smokrovic
University of Reading

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