Abstract

The conclusion of the dissertation is that while Habermasian social theory has the more adequate normative foundation, it lacks both the breadth of Weberian social science and the concreteness and determinacy of Weberian social policy. A fully articulated social theory must incorporate the strengths of both positions. ;Social theory can be seen as a three-part whole consisting of social science, value analysis, and social policy. In Part One of the dissertation the relationship between social science and value analysis is discussed in terms of the question of the scope of the social sciences. It is argued that an answer to this question systematically depends upon an answer to the conceptually prior question of the cognitive status of value judgments. Weber's restriction of this scope to a value-free appropriation of facts is based upon his thesis that value judgments are reducible to subjective--and ultimately arbitrary--decisions. For Habermas to justify the inclusion of critical evaluations of social structures and processes within the scope of the social sciences he must answer this "decisionism." Habermas first attempted to derive a non-arbitrary value standard for critical evaluations within a philosophy of history, specifically through tracing a "materialist dialectic of alienated labor." It is argued that this attempt was unsuccessful. In recent writings, however, Habermas has established that a principle of universalizability is built into the structure of speech. Armed with this standard for evaluation, those social systems can be criticized within which the universalizable interests of its members systematically are not met. And such critique can be said to fall within the scope of the social sciences. ;Part Two discusses the relationship between value analysis and the ultimate end sought in the social policies of the two theorists. The ultimate end of a social policy is a normative model of institutions constructed so as to embody certain value principles. Weber, continuing a tradition which extends from Thrasymachus through Machiavelli to Nietzsche, makes "power" the sole value principle operative in his social policy. It is shown how this principle determines the content of the fundamental institutional framework advocated by Weberian social policy. Certain internal criticisms of Weber's model are then made. In the final chapter arguments are presented which suggest that "universalizability" is a more adequate principle for social policy than "power." Then an attempt is made to construct a Habermasian normative model of institutions. Such a model would embody the principle of universalizability by institutionalizing public discourse in the spheres of socio-economic organizations and the state. Special attention is paid to how this involves a concept of "democracy" in sharp contrast to Weber's notion, which limits democracy to the acclamation of one or another set of self-chosen elites