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Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason
In Jussi Suikkanen & John Cottingham (eds.), Essays on Derek Parfit's On what matters. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 116–143 (2009)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Desire‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action Parfit on the Nature of Value Value‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action Why Parfit Prefers Value‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action to Desire‐Based Theories Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason and Parfit's Response.
desires, values, reasons, and dualism of practical reason Parfit's task in On What Matters ‐ defending version of ‘value‐based’ theory of reasons for action value‐based and desire‐based theories ‐ rival theories, what it is for something to be a reason for action desire‐based theories of reasons for action instance of R4 style principle ‐ governing formation of desires rules of rationality ‐ governing desire formation, one and all procedural R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6 principles desire‐based theories of reasons for action ‐ the weaker the better Parfit's ‘value‐based’ theory of reasons for action ‐ what Parfit calls value ‘in the reason‐involving sense’ Parfit's preference for value‐based theories of reasons for action
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Citations of this work
Against Moral Responsibilisation of Health: Prudential Responsibility and Health Promotion.Rebecca C. H. Brown, Hannah Maslen & Julian Savulescu - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):114-129.
Naturalizam i relativnost u pogledu praktičnih razloga (Engl. Naturalism and Relativism about Practical Reasons).Marko Jurjako - 2022 - In Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović & Majda Trobok (eds.), HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović. Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 113-139.
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