Abstract

This chapter explores the relevance of insights drawn from the Continental tradition of PhenomenologyPhenomenology for the solution of the long-standing “species problem” in the philosophy of biology. Returning to the roots of Continental PhenomenologyPhenomenology in the work of Edmund HusserlHusserl, Edmund, rather than to its later developments, the paper situates the discussion of the species concept in relation to the concepts of “intentionality” andIntentionalitythe “life-worldLife-world” as developed by HusserlHusserl, Edmund. Current conflicts surrounding the interpretation of the meaning of “species” in biological discourse are described in terms of two different intentional “thematizings” of the life-worldLife-world, both of which satisfy theoretical scientific interests. One of these deals with the interest in the synchronic classificationClassification of the world. The other concerns the diachronic historical development of life. It is argued that this Phenomenological analysis give a more satisfactory interpretation of the species problem than that which has been generated by conflicts between advocates of “individualist” and “class” conceptions of natural species. The larger goal of this chapter is to highlight the importance of Jean Gayon’s work in developing a dialogue between Continental and Analytic approaches to the philosophy of biology.