Abstract

This essay contains a critical analysis of common understandings of pain in animals and challenges common arguments for the presence of phenomenological pain sensations in non-human animals. I will argue that pain behaviors are neither necessary nor sufficient for pain sensations, the presence of nerve structures in non-human animals which are similar to that of humans are not sufficient for pain sensations, we cannot rely on similarities between human and non-human experiences of pain to argue for the presence of pain sensations in animals, unless we think that animals are self-conscious in the same way that humans are. In addition to this, possible moral implications of denying sensory pains in animals are discussed, as well as considering what animal pain experiences might be like if we reject the common understanding of animal pain; these considerations appeal to the arguments made by Peter Carruthers, who suggests an answer as to what non-human animals might experience in lieu of a sensory or phenomenological experience of pain. Though this analysis of animal pain is inconclusive as to the question of the existence of animal pains, it suggests that the likely hood of phenomenological pain sensations in non-human animals is low. Further, its goal is to demonstrate to the reader that our common understandings of and arguments for pain experiences in animals are not as sound as we may be inclined to think. Some caveats regarding the implications of accepting this argument are offered, and demonstrate that we need to abandon our empathetic inclinations towards these creatures in order to accept this conclusion.