American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329 (1985)

The author defines moral dilemmas as situations where there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, And the agent cannot adopt both, But neither moral requirement overrides the other. The author then argues that moral dilemmas are possible because conflicting moral requirements can be either symmetrical or incomparable in a way that is limited enough to be plausible but still strong enough to yield moral dilemmas
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References found in this work BETA

The Fragmentation of Value.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.

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Moral Dilemmas.Terrance McConnell - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas.Jussi Suikkanen - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):261-289.
I—I Ncommensurability and V Agueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.

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