God's Justified Knowledge and the Hard-Soft Fact Distinction

The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 8:69-73 (2006)
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Abstract

The distinction between hard and soft facts has been used by compatibilists to argue that God's divine foreknowledge is not incompatible with human free will. The debate over this distinction has ignored the question of the justification of divine knowledge. I argue that the distinction between hard and soft facts is illusory because the existence of soft facts presupposes that justification exists. Moreover, if the hard fact /soft fact distinction collapses, then God justifiably knows all future events, and human beings cannot possess free will.

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John R. Shook
Bowie State University

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