Particular Theology in Avicennan Philosophy

Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 13 (unknown)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An essence will not need a cause for existing if its existence is necessary for it. Likewise, if it is contingent, it will need a cause for existing. That explains for God's needlessness to a cause: a necessary existent can do without any cause.But how can that be? Any being that has existence in its reality will be a necessary existent essentially; its quiddity will, therefore, be equal to its being. It has its existence within its essence whereas other beings cannot have their existence by themselves.Given that God has a quiddity beside an existence, that existence shall either necessitate or annul the quiddity and either case is impossible. God has no genus and differentia because it has no quiddity. God is no aggregate of units because its existence shall then depend on the units and that contradicts the necessity of its existence. Furthermore, in that case the units or at least some of them will have to exist prior to the whole i.e. God and that, too, becomes impossible.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-12

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references