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Mental representation: Always delayed but not always ephemeral
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):223-224 (1992)
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Citations of this work
A model devoid of consciousness.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):176-177.
Do neuropsychologists think in terms of interactive models?Marcel Kinsbourne - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):72-73.
Descartes' fundamental mistake: Introspective singularity.Joseph E. Bogen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):175-176.
The “Multiple Drafts” model and the ontology of consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):177-178.
Counting consciousnesses: None, one, two, or none of the above?Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):178.
References found in this work
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
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