Flickering Shadows: Truth in 16mm (2020)

Abstract
In this analysis of the filmed discussion between P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans about truth (1973), I argue that both philosophers actually agree about truth, espousing a Ramseyan minimalism. Contrary to appearances, Strawson is not defending a pluralism about truth. Where Strawson and Evans disagree is about how to explain the "extensive coverage" of "fact-stating discourse." Strawson proposes the factuality of non-"primary" discourse (mathematical, moral, etc.) should be understood by analogical extension from that of "primary" empirical discourse. Evans resists such a quasi-realism about non-primary discourse. I argue that Strawson's goal of making room for stricter and looser kinds of factuality need not require his quasi-realism.
Keywords Truth  Minimalism about truth  Factuality  P.F. Strawson  Gareth Evans
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