Abstract

This thesis explores whether any theory of maximizing rationality can account for the normativity of instrumental rules. The central dilemma that any such account faces can be stated as follows: if conformity to an instrumental rule is not supported by the balance of reasons, it would be irrational to follow the rule in that instance. On the other hand, if conformity is supported by the balance of reasons, then the action should be performed for that reason alone, and not because it is required by the rule. Thus, it would seem as if rules are either irrational to follow or irrelevant to rational action. ;This thesis argues that all previous attempts to solve this dilemma fail because they assume that rules are means of making "decisions." Rather, it is suggested that rules affect practical reasoning by precluding future decision-making. One who adopts a rule is constraining his future self so that he will not be free to choose later on when the rule is deemed applicable. According to this account, it would not be irrational for an agent to apply a rule when doing so does more harm than good, given that the agent has no choice but to act accordingly. ;In order to lend credence to this conception of rules, this thesis employs the techniques of sequential choice theory to show that rules are commonly adopted in those situations where agents could not rationally believe that they would follow these rules if unconstrained. Rules must, therefore, be constraints on action, for if not, people would have to be seen as engaging in mass irrational behavior. ;The implications of this view for the theory of adjudication are then sketched. Contrary to many neo-Natural Law accounts, it is argued that any reasonable jurisprudential theory must interpret judicial behavior as constrained by the rules of law and not by the principles of political morality. ;This thesis concludes by suggesting that those who constrain their future selves by adopting rules may nevertheless be required to abandon their commitments in certain circumstances.