Issues in Epistemology

Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 30 (unknown)
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Abstract

Generally speaking and irrespective of their types, knowledge and perception have no intention other than the discovery and expression of the realities beyond themselves. These features originate from their essence and represent the concept of correspondence from the viewpoint of the knower and perceiver. Therefore, they should inevitably speak of a corresponding being in a receptacle of the receptacles of nqf's al-dmr from which it has been derived. This very issue is the very realization of the validity criterion for all sciences. Such representativeness or expression of corresspondence, which has arisen out of the innermost of the meaning of knowledge and is inseparable from it, is an inevitable issue, whether in affirmative affairs or in imaginative ones.In other words, if either correspondence or non-correspondence alone dominate human perception, the sanctity and value of knowledge will not only be questioned, but also totally eliminated, since universal non-correspondence is a gate that obviously gives way to annihilation. The form of universal non-correspondence means the dependence of reality on thought, which leads to nowhere but accepting the relativity and rejection of truth.This kind of scientific correspondence is the one whose universality and correctness have been generally discussed by epistemologists merely in the field of imagination.

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