Alternative Frameworks and Counterpossibles

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):24-41 (2016)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show why the theories of impossible worlds do not fully solve the problem of counterpossibles, but merely shift it. Moreover, by making a distinction between two types of languages, we will show that some expectations about proper theory of counterfactuals might be too great.

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Maciej Sendłak
University of Warsaw

Citations of this work

In between impossible worlds.Maciej Sendłak - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.
Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism.Maciej Sendłak - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):515-531.

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References found in this work

Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
Impossible Worlds.Daniel Nolan - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):360-372.
Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
The Ontology of Impossible Worlds.David A. Vander Laan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):597-620.
On what there is not.Richard Routley - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.

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