Distinguishing Myth from Reality: Are Pragmatic Tools Sufficient?

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 260 (2):187-205 (2012)
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Abstract

Recent evolutionists who claim that religious beliefs have a physiological basis have cited William James as a precursor. I argue that James's naturalistic evolutionary account of religious belief undermines, rather than supports, their position, and that John Dewey is a more apt guide to the particular relationship of science to religion they espouse. Furthermore, in his support of religious beliefs James tips the scale too far in the direction of subjectivity to provide sufficient safeguards from the inroads of scientific skepticism, while Dewey underestimates the strength of non-rational emotional factors in sustaining religious beliefs.

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