On What You Cannot Be Mistaken About?

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3):351-362 (2011)
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Abstract

The paper sketches an analysis of the notion of a self-fulfilling belief in terms of doxastic modal logic. We point out a connection between self-fulfilling beliefs and Moore’s paradox. Then we look at self-fulfilling beliefs in the context of neighborhood semantics. We argue that the analysis of several interesting self-fulfilling beliefs has to make essential use of propositional quantification.

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Igor Sedlár
Czech Academy of Sciences

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