Too simple solutions of hard problems

Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):138-146 (2010)
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Abstract

Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.

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2010-08-16

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Peter Schuster
University of Leeds

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References found in this work

Foundations of Constructive Analysis.John Myhill - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):744-747.
Proof theory.K. Schütte - 1977 - New York: Springer Verlag.
Constructive Analysis.Errett Bishop & Douglas Bridges - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):1047-1048.
Intuitionism As Generalization.Fred Richman - 1990 - Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):124-128.
Foundations of Constructive Mathematics.Michael J. Beeson - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (4):398-399.

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