Moral Realism and Indeterminacy

In Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.

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10.1093/0199257760.003.0007

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Stephen Schiffer
New York University

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