Abstract

Color theories share a similar goal---each attempts to specify the nature of color. Many color theories attempt to specify the nature of colors through a reductive analysis. The assumption underlying each of the predominant reductive color theories is that there is an unambiguous and determinate account of colors. ;I argue that a determinate account of color cannot be given for each of the major reductive color theories. The reason is that each theory faces the problem of disjunctive indeterminacy. For any one color, there is a disjunctively indeterminate set of properties realizing that color. This disjunctive indeterminacy takes two forms. First, there is the problem of different kinds instantiating colors. This form of disjunctive indeterminacy is akin to the multiple realizability problem. Second, there is the problem of open-ended sets of homogeneous kinds. Based on empirical evidence, I argue that one is unable to close this disjunctive set. The inability to close the disjunctive set entails the failure to specify the nature of colors. I argue that this indeterminacy arises for Hilbert's surface spectral reflectance objectivism, Hardin's neurophysiological subjectivism, and Thompson's ecological colors, to name a few. ;I argue that a relational theory holds the most promise. But, facts about color vision and chromatic processes suggest that the only way to escape the indeterminacy is through a non-reductive, token-identify account of colors. I sketch a dispositional account in which colors are individually contextualized and where one specifies colors in terms of their functional role for a perceiver. The result is a theory in which it is a contingent and empirical matter in each manifestation as to the categorical base present during that manifestation. Also, colors share a common dispositional property, but not necessarily a common categorical property